Attacks on Iran Destroy Non-Proliferation Around the World

The attack on Iran was a reckless, criminal act of aggression by both the U.S. and Israel and it will have profound ramifications that will echo for decades to come.

At this writing, Donald Trump’s clumsy effort at a ceasefire between Israel and Iran seems to be holding. If it stays in place and Israel’s ambitions for a regime change war are frustrated, we will have averted what could have been a much worse disaster.

Yet what has happened will have profound and long-lasting effects in many ways. One of the most profound will be the impact on entire regime of nuclear nonproliferation. I explore that here.

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While a shaky ceasefire has at least held off some of the potentially dangerous ramifications from Donald Trump’s and Benjamin Netanyahu’s reckless actions in Iran, that does not mean that what has already happened doesn’t have grave implications.

The Iranian attack Monday on the American al-Udeid airbase in Qatar was largely symbolic. Iran warned Qatar ahead of time, giving the Qataris and Americans enough time to organize their defense and for the Americans to evacuate the base of all but essential personnel. As a result, there were, thankfully, no casualties.

This was Iran’s attempt to respond to the American attack without escalating the conflict. It appears to have succeeded. Iran also seems to have correctly calculated that Trump’s decision to focus the American attack solely on Iran’s nuclear facilities meant that Trump wanted to avoid getting involved in a war of regime change and wanted to find a way to pull Israel away from such action that he could justify by saying he had “taken care” of the Iran nuclear “threat.”

But the ceasefire, even if it holds (a dubious prospect, but not impossible), does not solve the problems nor does it erase the damage this attack on Iran has done. A major casualty, one that has been damaged likely beyond repair, is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Iran was just attacked without provocation and under the excuse of its having carried out activities that were allowed to it under international treaties. Lest we forget, Iran—which, unlike Israel, is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—is permitted under that treaty to pursue civilian nuclear power, which includes the ability to enrich uranium, although this is not specifically spelled out in the NPT. That there have been recent violations by Iran of both the requirement to submit to IAEA inspections and the civilian-use limit on enrichment is entirely the result of American and Israeli sanctions and attacks that have left Iran with few options and little leverage at the negotiating table. Thus, they had to create such leverage, which they did by enriching uranium to 60% and by limiting their cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

While the American attack did considerable damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities, it is unclear just how extensive that damage was. The warning Iran had of the attack gave them a chance to move their highly enriched uranium stockpile. The fact that there have been no radiation surges detected in the wake of the attack is a sign that either those stockpiles were buried deep in the earth by the attack or, more likely, that Iran moved them before the attack.

In other words, the “Iran nuclear issue” is still unresolved. The enriched uranium and other materials probably still exist in Iran, the infrastructure can be rebuilt, and the technical knowledge of nuclear power is still there. What has changed is that if Iran ever does decide to pursue a nuclear weapon it will take a longer time and now, in the wake of these attacks, they have far more reason than before to pursue such a weapon.

Changing Iran’s position on nuclear weapons

At the risk of mimicking a broken record, I’ll restate the fundamental point that Iran was not pursuing a nuclear weapon. It is possible that, at the beginning of the century, they had been seriously considering it, but the evidence for that, though certainly real, is far from conclusive. It is just as possible and much more likely that they wanted to achieve the capacity to create a nuclear weapon in short order as a deterrent (this is referred to as being a “nuclear threshold state,” a condition which includes Japan, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Brazil).

One might well have asked why they weren’t pursuing a nuclear weapon, given the ceaseless belligerence from the only nuclear power in the Mideast, Israel, and the only country to ever use a nuclear weapon, the United States, which annihilated hundreds of thousands of innocent people in 1945, maimed countless more and left lasting effects that are still felt to this day. Yet, the fact is, uncomfortable as it may be for so many regime change hawks in the U.S. and Israel, Iran has not pursued a nuclear weapon.

But now, the voices for pursuing a nuclear weapon are certain to increase significantly both in number and enthusiasm. Iranians have eyes and they have brains, and those organs inform them that the United States and Israel have caused enormous death and destruction in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, East Timor, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Somalia, among others.

We may note that North Korea is not on that list, despite some significant tensions in recent years. The reason for that distinction is obvious.

Consider too the caution with which the United States and NATO have approached Russia since its invasion of Ukraine. That caution stems from the concern that Vladimir Putin might use nuclear weapons.

In essence, the American and Israeli actions have communicated to Iran that they are fools not to have pursued a nuclear weapon. We have sent them a strong message telling them that if they had a nuke, Israel and the U.S. would not have dared to attack them. And if they want to avoid a future of constant bullying from those two aggressive and lawless nations, they had better get a nuclear deterrent as soon as they can.

Whether that is the course Iran pursues going forward remains to be seen. The implication of that same message from the U.S. to Iran is that if Tehran does pursue a nuclear weapon, Washington will hit them again. Either path is fraught with peril for Iran, but whatever they choose, the recent American and Israeli attacks, and especially the fact that diplomacy was used as a cover to catch Iran off-guard, have given a great deal more strength to the argument within Iran for developing a nuclear weapon.

Destroying the NPT

Iran’s Parliament is already drafting legislation calling for withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But the threat of Iran leaving the treaty is only the beginning.

The NPT, we would do well to remember, is one of the most successful international treaties in history. 190 countries are signatories to the NPT, and only five are not. North Korea is, to date, the only state to have left the NPT, while India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Sudan never joined it. Of those, only South Sudan does not have a nuclear weapon.

The NPT is not exactly a fair treaty. It allowed the five states that had nukes at the time of the treaty’s drafting to keep them. This created a hierarchy of strategic power that is justifiably viewed as problematic by other states. Moreover, both the United States and, since 2023, Russia have essentially supplied nuclear weapons to allied states, although they still have the ultimate control for their actual deployment.

Still, the treaty has prevented the mass proliferation of weapons in other states, and it’s hard to argue that this is not a strong, positive development overall.

The four nuclear states who are not party to the NPT represent a grave concern for all of the world. India and Pakistan often have cross-border clashes, usually centered on the disputed region of Kashmir. A wrong move at any time could trigger horror.

North Korea is a highly secretive state with an autocratic leader who certainly gives the impression of instability and megalomania. The country itself is in a desperate economic state, increasing the volatility of the situation. China keeps a close eye on North Korea and, as North Korea’s largest trading partner and supporter, has considerable influence over its leader, Kim Jong-Un.

For most Americans and Europeans, Israel seems the least worrisome of the nuclear states. That is, of course, a perception held because it is a close ally of the U.S. and many European countries. Israel is also perceived (incorrectly in terms of demographics, but correctly in terms of its internal class and power structure) as a “white” and, in many ways correctly, as a European-style country.

In fact, of all the nuclear powers in the world, whether under the NPT or outside of it, Israel is, I would argue, by far the most likely to use a nuclear weapon and to do so with the lowest level of provocation.

It is Israel that has routinely attacked its neighbors. It’s Israel that maintains an apartheid state, and has routinely supported authoritarianism in the Middle East, as well as in Central America, not to mention apartheid in South Africa. Israel has a fanatically radical and racist government, where ministers join with their extremist followers in chanting “mavet l’aravim,” or “death to Arabs.”

It is also Israel that, for reasons both real and imagined, exists in a state of perpetual fear, believing that the entire world, even including its allies, are plotting its demise. Israel’s well-known “Samson Option” is a plan for a massive nuclear strike in the event the country is facing defeat and conquest in battle. As we saw with the so-called Hannibal Directive on October 7, 2023, such doctrines are applied in practice well before their prerequisites on paper are met.

Israel is by far the country most likely to use nuclear weapons. Yet it is allowed to continue to stockpile its nuclear armaments. Recent estimates are that Israel has 90 nuclear missiles and sufficient equipment and stockpiles to quickly double that number or even more.

Yet Israel is purported to be the one in danger. And in the United States and Europe few but the most outspoken social and political activists even suggest, much less demand, that Israel sign on to the NPT, give up its nuclear arms, and submit to IAEA inspections.

Meanwhile, those same Americans and Europeans are willing to attack a country in Iran that, even in the unkindest reading, was certainly abiding by the 2015 nuclear deal until Trump unilaterally abrogated it. That deal made far greater demands on Iran than the NPT.

In that context, the American and Israeli attacks on Iran thoroughly discredit the NPT. Beyond the strong possibility that Iran will leave the treaty, it is more than possible that other states, whether they have the desire or means to pursue a nuclear weapon or not, may follow Iran out the door.

More to the point, there is every reason to believe that if Iran does leave the NPT, Saudi Arabia would copy the move. So might the United Arab Emirates, and even Egypt. At that point, why would any country anywhere in the world that might feel the need to defend itself today or in the future remain in the treaty?

We’ve been here before

In 1981, Israel bombed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor. Israel claimed the reactor was on the verge of creating sufficient plutonium for a nuclear bomb.

Initial international reactions, including from the United States, was overwhelmingly negative and Israel was criticized harshly for the action. But it suffered no material penalties, and, eventually, the incident was at first forgiven and, when Saddam Hussein went from being a western asset in the 1980s to Public Enemy No. 1 in the 1990s, Israel seemed to have been vindicated.

But that was dependent on believing the initial lie that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon. It wasn’t. The reactor at Osirak was purchased from France and was developed in cooperation with French authorities. They insisted that the reactor was used strictly for civilian nuclear power.

Importantly, the only evidence for Iraq pursuing a nuclear weapon was the Osirak reactor itself. In 1982, Prof. Richard Wilson, a Harvard University physicist, inspected the damaged reactor. His conclusion was unambiguous: not only was Iraq not using the reactor to produce a weapon, but the reactor was also incapable being used in such a manner.

Wilson said that the reactor had been specially designed by French engineers to be unsuitable for building a weapon and couldn’t have been modified because it was regularly inspected by both French engineers and the IAEA.

In 2012, Wilson told Mehdi Hasan, "The Iraqis couldn't have been developing a nuclear weapon at Osirak. I challenge any scientist in the world to show me how they could have done so."

The attack on Osirak drove Saddam’s nuclear research underground and away from inspection. There is no evidence that Saddam was pursuing a nuclear weapon before the Osirak attack, but after it, he funded an accelerated nuclear weapons program and, when the United States attacked him nine years later, was close to being able to build one.

In other words, the Osirak attack didn’t prevent a nuclear threat from emerging in Iraq, it ignited and spurred on that threat.

It is still possible to work out a deal with Iran for nuclear power in that country. A clandestine nuclear program is harder to conceal in 2025 than it was in 1982. But it will be a lot harder to achieve considering the amount of deception the United States and Israel have engaged in while Iran has largely acted entirely above board on this matter. Despite that fact, the dynamics of power and the political situation will still place the burden of proof on Iran, as unfair as that may be.

Iran surely knows this. It still has every reason to try to work out a deal that lifts the sanctions that will hurt even more now that Israel has damaged significant parts of the Iranian civil infrastructure. But they will also hold very dear the idea of “fool me once shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me.”

It’s hard to see the United States or Israel, given the boundless arrogance of those two states, being willing to engage in confidence-building measures that boost their trustworthiness rather than that of their adversaries.

But they have now created a real possibility that Iran will try to acquire a nuclear weapon, something—and this cannot be repeated often enough—THEY WERE NOT TRYING TO DO BEFORE!

Ultimately this war may restart very soon, but if it doesn’t, we can certainly content ourselves that it could have been much worse. But let’s not kid ourselves: it was a reckless, criminal act of aggression by both the U.S. and Israel and it will have profound ramifications that will echo for decades to come.

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News Roundup

What Iran achieved during the conflict with Israel

By Rayhan Uddin, Middle East Eye, June 24, 2025

Inside story: 'Conclusion' to Iran-Israel war expected after Iranian retaliation for US bombings

Amwaj Media, June 23, 2025

Israel kills more than 80 people in Gaza, including dozens of aid seekers

Al Jazeera, June 24, 2025

Syria: IS splinter group behind church bombing

By Jon Shelton, Deutsche Weille, June 24, 2025

It's Not Just Netanyahu. A Lot of Israelis Want Genocide, Too

By Dianna Buttu, Zeteo, June 23, 2025

Likud MKs invoke ‘hanging,’ ‘firing squad’ in hearing on impeaching Arab lawmaker

By Sam Sokol, Times of Israel, June 24, 2025

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