Biden Vs Trump On Ukraine
Biden's policies have not been successful in Ukraine, but if Trump wins in November, the nightmare of his presidency will be worse in Ukraine than anywhere else.
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As Americans, we have a responsibility to the rest of the world to try to change US foreign policy into something less destructive. Far more than voters in any other country, the people Americans put into power have a profound effect on the rest of the planet.
That effect is consistently negative, with a few exceptions, and that negativity is very much bipartisan. That is not to say that all administrations are the same. There are variations on the theme of “pursuing US interests,” which generally means maintaining American imperial designs and global hegemony. And, at each election, it is important to look at how those things might differ. But overall, we have a range of choices on domestic policy, at least some of which are decent (often these are on social issues like reproductive rights or LGBTQIA rights) our choices in terms of foreign policy are limited to varying degrees of awful.
Joe Biden vs Donald Trump is an unusual case. Unless you’re a very racist and selective isolationist, there is simply no defending Trump on foreign affairs. For his part, Biden has bungled the Middle East so badly, it might cost him the election.
I don’t think I need to remind anyone familiar with my work of my low opinion of Biden in general, especially on foreign policy. Obviously, that is most acute in his backing of the genocide Israel is conducting in Gaza.
I have also been vocal in my critiques of Biden’s policy on Ukraine, even though I agree that Russian aggression must be opposed and, if possible, thwarted. I simply think Biden has gone about it in the wrong way, that his decisions have limited his options, and left Ukraine in a very bad position. I’ll get into more detail on that point, but there is another point that must be explored first: his opponent.
The existential danger of Trump on Ukraine
There should be no illusions of how disastrous Donald Trump will be regarding Ukraine, Russia, and Europe in general. There is also no limit to how dangerous it could be.
Trump deals with foreign policy in a transactional manner, and he makes it personal. We know from his time in office that he admires Vladimir Putin, and it has been clear even during Biden’s term that there is a significant portion of the Republican party that is right there with him, seeing Putin as a partner, rather than an adversary. Putin’s nationalism, bigotry, homo- and transphobia, and autocratic tendencies match the MAGA vision well.
Just as important, Trump is hostile to Ukraine. He has surely not forgotten that his first impeachment was the result of his attempts to pressure Ukraine into doing his dirty business for him, and that Ukraine resisted him.
It’s unlikely that Trump would cut off all arms to Ukraine on day one. That is a little too obvious and he will probably have some people around him to convince him to go slower. They’ll tell him to start by pulling back on the intelligence and training assistance Ukraine is getting from the US, which is far less visible to the general public, and is also not bringing in any money. The tens of billions of dollars in military equipment and arms to Ukraine is all money going into the coffers of American arms manufacturers. Trump will be hesitant to stop that flow of taxpayer money.
So, that part will take a little longer, but it is a virtual certainty that US aid to Ukraine will not survive a Trump presidency for very long.
As I’ll explain when I contrast to Biden’s policy, I am not a fan of the US strategy of blindly arming Ukraine while eschewing diplomacy of any kind, which is what we’ve done since months before the invasion.
But neither do I agree with some in the antiwar movement who call for an immediate halt to weapons supplies to Ukraine. We promised to stand by Ukraine “for as long as it takes” and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian military proceeded on that understanding in their defense plans.
Simply abandoning that promise is not only incredibly dishonorable, but also murderous and suicidal policy. True, with the arms and intelligence assistance from the EU, UK, and US the war is increasingly looking like a long-term stalemate at best. But withdrawing that support not only means Russia’s takeover of some 18% of Ukraine’s territory is a done deal, but it will also likely lead to Russia renewing its ambition to topple the government in Kyiv and return Ukraine to its former status as a Russian vassal state.
That is incredibly dangerous, especially given that Trump’s attitude toward NATO vacillates between ambivalence and hostility. I am not entirely sold on the general notion that if Ukraine falls, Russia will threaten NATO countries next, but if Trump is in office, it is undeniable that such a possibility grows rapidly. Putin may well judge that the US under Trump will not fulfill its Article 5 obligations to come to the defense of another NATO country under attack, and that is certain to embolden him.
So what’s wrong with Biden’s policy?
Biden’s policy in Ukraine is rooted in Cold War thinking, disdain for diplomacy, and a lack of strategic thinking, as opposed to Palestine and Israel where it’s motivated by fanatical Zionism and racist devaluing of the lives of Palestinians, biases on clear display long before the attacks by Hamas on October 7. Biden’s goal of driving Russia out of Ukrainian territory is a correct one.
One of the core principles of the post-World War II international order and international law is the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. The sovereign territory of another state is inviolable. So even if Russia had valid claims to Crimea and the Donbas (which it doesn’t), it would not justify their actions in 2014, or 2022. Biden is absolutely right to defend that principle, even if he has been unbelievably hypocritical when it comes to applying that standard to US allies such as Israel on the Golan Heights and Morocco in Western Sahara.
Still, whether it’s a matter of principle or strategy, acting against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the right thing to do. The problem is that Biden has pursued a strategy of confrontation alone. No doubt, Putin would not have responded positively if Biden had just asked him nicely to please leave Ukraine alone. But a strongman like Putin, who believes that showing any sign of weakness could lead to his demise, will also not respond well to threats, especially if he feels those threats may not be all that threatening. And even less if he believes he has the upper hand.
Yet threats were all Biden employed. From time to time, Secretary of State Antony Blinken or Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin would talk with their Russian counterparts, but all they discussed were US red lines and the actions the US and its allies would take if Russia invaded Ukraine. This was evident in both public statements and reports from the meetings or calls.
As I’ve pointed out before, Russia has no excuse for its 2014 annexation of Crimea, its takeover of parts of the Donbas and Eastern Ukraine, or the invasion two years ago. None whatsoever. But that doesn’t mean that Russia didn’t have some legitimate concerns and reasonable fears that might have been assuaged through diplomacy.
Many argue that even if there were productive discussions, Putin would not have been dissuaded from his invasion. That’s certainly a possibility. But we’ll never know because Biden refused to try.
What are those concerns? Russia (correctly) considers the Black Sea and access to it through the warm water port in Crimea a major strategic asset. After the Cold War, Russia maintained that access through a series of agreements with Ukraine. After the 2014 uprising that ousted Viktor Yanukovych, Russia feared that Ukraine’s increasing tilt toward the West threatened that agreement. Again—and I will keep repeating this for the vast numbers who seem unable to understand it no matter how many times I say it—this in no way justifies ANY military action on Russia’s part. But it was a clear point that could have been negotiated in 2022 if Biden wanted to resolve the matter in talks. Whether Putin would have cooperated is unknown because Biden refused to try.
The US and other NATO allies assured Russian leaders as the Soviet Union crumbled that NATO would not expand toward Russia, yet it has been doing so consistently for the past three decades, despite warnings from many of its diplomats in Russia throughout those years. Given that expansion and the very public invitation George W. Bush extended to Ukraine to join as well quite naturally made Russia nervous, especially after seeing what the US did to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Even the most democratic, peace-loving Russian leader would have had legitimate reason for concern, much less a ruthless, nationalistic, brutal dictator like Vladimir Putin.
Ukraine itself recognized that there were concerns that needed to be addressed. The peace terms that it worked out in Spring 2022 in talks with Russia reflect this. At that time, negotiators had come to an agreement that would have allowed for Ukraine to propose a security pact with western nations and Russia would have pulled back to the lines before the invasion. The Donbas and Crimea would be dealt with later. This would have been a significant victory for Ukraine, even if it did not mean the conflict was settled.
Two things prevented this. First, in mid- and late-April, a flood of reports of the atrocities Russian troops had committed in Ukraine surfaced, greatly hardening the hearts of the Ukrainian people, a hardening the leadership was not immune to.
But the second thing was much more impactful. The justified rage of Ukrainians could have been mollified by having beaten back Russia’s latest aggression against all odds. After all, this invasion dwarfed anything Russia had done to it since Ukraine got its independence from the USSR in 1991, and it failed utterly in its ambition to destroy Ukraine. But instead, Boris Johnson—who would never have done this other than at the behest of the United States—suddenly popped up in Kyiv.
According to a close Zelenskyy associate, quoted in a pro-government Ukrainian newspaper, “Johnson brought two simple messages to Kyiv. The first is that Putin is a war criminal; he should be pressured, not negotiated with. And the second is that even if Ukraine is ready to sign some agreements on guarantees with Putin, they are not.”
The message was clear: Ukraine could sign whatever agreement it wanted, of course, but the West wouldn’t support it. Without the possibility of a security pact (which included, in Ukraine’s proposal, a guarantee of more military aid and the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine in the event of another invasion, but crucially did not promise NATO boots on the ground and eschewed NATO membership), Ukraine would remain vulnerable, and there was little sense for Ukraine to strike such a deal. So this was, in practice, a US-UK veto of a peace deal Ukraine had negotiated in good faith.
Instead, the US and UK—which, in the wake of Putin’s initial attack in February had offered to get Zelenskyy out of the country, essentially encouraging him to surrender because they did not believe Ukraine could withstand the Russian assault even with their aid—now wanted to beat Putin back and believed they could, even without putting their own soldiers’ lives on the line.
The Biden administration’s thinking at the time was that there was an opportunity to “weaken Russia,” as Lloyd Austin put it-, and to re-establish American global leadership and NATO’s primacy, both of which had been badly damaged by Trump. Even when supporters of Biden’s policy considered diplomacy, it was only to be pursued later, after Putin had been dealt a sufficient blow on the battlefield, making him more receptive to agreements.
What they failed to understand is that the opportunity they were speaking of had already presented itself and Biden declined it. Russia, one of the world’s premier military powers, had attacked Ukraine with overwhelming force, but had utterly failed in its objective of toppling the government in Kyiv. Indeed, while it made some territorial gains, they were really minimal considering the force expended to acquire them. And the fighting has been essentially in stalemate ever since, with only minor gains for each side here and there.
The West snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by failing to recognize how incredible Ukraine’s victory in 2022 was. They mistakenly doubling down, believing they could deal more setbacks to Russia. They told Zelenskyy that he could count on western support for as long as it takes to drive Russia out of every inch of Ukrainian territory.
The problem is, neither the United States nor the European countries can actually guarantee that. A Republican victory in the US is likely to doom US aid to Ukraine, and even if the Democrats hold on somehow, we’re seeing right now the damage can do even when the Democrats control the Senate and the White House.
Europe has its own concerns about maintaining its current level of aid to Ukraine, let alone making up for American shortfalls, and it has suffered from the loss of trade with Russia, which the US, for the most part, has not.
These are the reasons that we’ve seen Zelenskyy getting more and more impatient, even angry with the West. He’s right, too. We made commitments that we should not have made, because we cannot guarantee that we can keep them. Biden cannot say what will happen when he’s out of office. He can’t even say what will happen if Congress shifts to the GOP, as we see right now as the House Speaker has ground military aid to Ukraine to a halt.
So what’s the right policy?
Crafting a viable and positive policy on Ukraine has to start by acknowledging the failures of the approach Biden, supported by his top aides and his congressional support base of conservative Democrats have pursued thus far. That’s both the starting point and the biggest hurdle, because American leaders resist admitting mistakes more passionately than Starbucks resists unions.
But assuming there is someone in Washington who is willing to rethink policy, the major shift should be a combination of defense and diplomacy, rather than relying only on arms. The US and Europe have let one opportunity after another pass them by, and as time has gone by, Putin’s position has gotten stronger.
It is very unlikely that Russia will be moved out of the territories it captured in 2014 by force. But two principles must guide the west: one, that it must not acquiesce to ever recognize Russia’s illegally occupied territory, and two, that it must prevent more loss of Ukrainian territory at all costs. This last is crucial to make it clear to Putin that dragging the war out is only going to continue to drain Russian resources, cost Russian lives, and maintain ever-growing sanctions.
This point is important. Sanctions have done some damage to Russia’s economy—as usual, mostly hitting common people, although some have been specifically targeted toward oligarchs—but they have not had anywhere close to the impact that the US hoped. They’re not really deterring Putin and likely won’t, but they can still serve a purpose as an incentive if their removal is used as a bargaining chip. As a chip they might be effective where as a weapon they have not been.
While it may be too late at this point, an effort to get back to the deal of March 2022 sis worthwhile: security guarantees for Ukraine of aid and air defense, but not boots on the ground or direct NATO-Russian engagement; Ukraine agrees not to join NATO; Russia pulls back to the pre-February 2022 positions; the West ends sanctions; the Russian-occupied territories from 2014 would then be the subject of negotiation between Putin and Zelensky. That could go on for a long time, and is far from ideal, as there was plenty of fighting between 2014 and 2022, but it beats endless war.
Putin might not even talk on those terms. Indeed, at this point, Zelenskyy has also hardened and vowed not to stop the fight until every inch of Ukrainian territory has been liberated. But he might be willing to fight that fight in ways other than military confrontation if that means stopping the destruction that Ukraine continues to suffer. In the end, of course, this is Ukraine’s decision. But Ukraine’s allies need to also be honest on what they can and cannot guarantee.
To be sure, until terms like those can be worked out, the west must ensure that Russia has no hope of fulfilling its ambition of destroying Ukraine as an independent entity, potentially carving it up and certainly dominating it.
There are several alternatives to that kind of strategy. One is to continue to double down on a purely military approach, as has been done for the past two years. That has led to stalemate, with death tolls and destruction mounting, but neither side gaining any sort of advantage. A long war does not favor Ukraine, both because of the unreliability of western support and because Russia is simply a bigger and more powerful military force.
Another is for the US and Europe to defend Ukraine directly. That means direct conflict with Russia, and it brings with it the potential for Chinese involvement or escalation to nuclear weapons. In either case, it means World War III. That might be avoided if the US and Europe gives Ukraine more offensive weapons, but that, too, risks major Russian retaliation against a NATO country and, again, World War III.
Indeed, pursuing the current strategy of arming and training Ukraine in the hope that what hasn’t worked for two years will suddenly start working also runs the risk of escalation, albeit considerably less than NATO actually engaging Russia directly.
The right policy is to end the war as quickly as possible, while adhering to the two principles of never recognizing Russia’s control of any occupied territory and not allowing Russia to take any more, before it turns into a global cataclysm either because of escalation or because western support for Ukraine runs out. Stop eschewing diplomacy, abandon the illusion that Ukraine will be able to reclaim territory Russia stole ten years ago by force of arms alone, and find a way to move forward. Admit when something hasn’t worked and try what we should have tried in the first place: defense and diplomacy combined. That need not change the goal of removing Russia from every bit of Ukrainian land. It only changes the method.
This needs to happen soon, because if Trump does get into office again, all hope is lost. That will be true in many ways, but none more clearly than in Ukraine.
News Roundup
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By Jeremy Scahill, Ryan Grim, and Daniel Boguslaw, The Intercept, February 28, 2024, https://theintercept.com/2024/02/28/new-york-times-anat-schwartz-october-7/
These words are penned in hunger from northern Gaza. I have little energy to go on
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Flour soaked in blood: ‘Flour Massacre’ survivors tell their story
By Tareq S. Hajjaj, Mondoweiss, March 4, 2024, https://mondoweiss.net/2024/03/flour-soaked-in-blood/
How Long Can Joe Biden Keep Hiding From His Own Voters?
By Jeet Heer, The Nation, March 4, 2024, https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/biden-gaza-hiding-voters-campaign/
What lies behind the Biden administration’s changing ‘ceasefire’ language
By Phyllis Bennis, Al Jazeera, March 4, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/3/4/what-lies-behind-the-biden-administrations-changing-ceasefire-language
What we know about Palestinian talks in Russia seeking unity
By Adam Lucente, Al-Monitor, March 1, 2024,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/what-we-know-about-palestinian-talks-russia-seeking-unity#ixzz8TZTxTCRi
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